The Alternate Minister of National Defence Fotis Kouvelis, at an interview he gave to the newspaper “Avgi tis Kiriakis” (22/04/2018) and the journalist Ghiorgos Meliggonis, stated the following:
Mister Minister, according to the calculations until now, the past 15 years constant flights of combat aircraft for the deterrence of Turkish aircraft have cost many human lives, like the one of Captain Baltadoros, but also 160 mil. Euros for usage cost. Is this the reason why you referred to an “undeclared war” in the Aegean Sea?
My reference to an “undeclared war” was accompanied by the data your question also reports. The violations and infringements of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft compel deterrence from our aircraft, and this is not an easy task. Many human lives have been lost, for example the 34-year-old Ghiorgos Baltadoros. We have spent, and we are still spending, significant amounts of money for deterrence flights by our aircraft; needless to say of course that the cost of losing human lives is what painfully comes first. The patrols performed by Hellenic Navy and Hellenic Coast Guard vessels are also costly.
On one side, we have seen that the Turkish PM B. Yildirim hurried to call Al. Tsipras after the Greek Mirage fell, and that was an action that was translated as Ankara’s message that it does not wish to strain Greek-Turkish relations. On the other hand, Mr. Yildirim made his usual provocative statements concerning the retreat of Greek flags from islets. Is this a tactic of controlled escalation or is it a slippery course towards a “warm incident”?
The fact that the Turkish PM Yildirim called our country’s PM Alexis Tsipras to express his condolences on the death of the Captain could be interpreted as an attempt to de-escalate the tension caused by Turkey, if we didn’t have his statements, a few days later, concerning the supposed retreat of Greek flags by the islets. In fact, these statements came with Turkey’s “advice” towards Greece. I view such actions as a tactical manoeuvre which does not resolve the tension existing in our relations. Such tension could transform one of its usual actions to a “warm” incident which, currently, doesn’t seem to be Turkey’s choice. The answer to Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric is that no “grey zones” exist. No Greek islands or islets are disputed. Our national sovereign rights are definite and delimitated by international treaties and International Law in general. Turkey gets exposed and it constantly nullifies its foreign policy with the escalation it incites, and with its unacceptable actions. Greece is a peaceful country, with an effective deterrent ability to protect its national sovereign rights.
Do you expect to see a change of course by the Turkish President after Turkey’s elections, if he gets re-elected?
The tension caused by the Turkish President is also projected in Turkey’s domestic affairs, in order to form a certain state of affairs that he wants to manipulate before the elections, but also serves to counterbalance Turkey’s intense social problems. His re-election may not mean, by itself, a change of course; it will rather be interdependent from general issues of Turkey’s foreign policy instability, which currently suffers by its own contradictions.
Many claim that Turkey’s activity against Greece and the E.U., whether we refer to the escalated aggressiveness in the Aegean Sea or the doublespeak adopted in the refugee issue, are simply a disguise of its goals for the Cypriot EEZ, which are the core of its claims. What are your thoughts on that?
I believe that the tension provoked by Turkey to its relations with Greece mainly refers to the Cypriot EEZ. Turkey includes the issue of the Cypriot EEZ to a broader framework of its aspiration to have the correlations in the wider region reshaped. Turkey’s general plans to tackle the problems it currently faces cultivate its choice to escalate the tension with our country.
How do you answer to the accusations that the escalation in Greek-Turkish relations leads Greece into participating to a race for armaments, which were expressed after the disclosure that Greece will obtain two French frigates?
Greece cannot enter an armaments race. What Greece should do is to constantly serve a procedure of enhancing its deterrence power. For example, the case of upgrading some of our aircraft is pending since 2004. Does it have to be done? My answer is yes. This does not mean that we participate in the armaments race. The two frigates we refer to and involve leasing are not part of a decision taken last week; there is a whole procedure behind them. The purchase of two more frigates is also being studied, probably not with leasing. However, I cannot put the cart before the horse and state anything, because the discussions are ongoing.
The two Greek servicemen are still held in a maximum security prison in Andrianoupolis and no one can predict when will the end of their adventure be. Do you believe that the problem is the Turkish justice’s weakness to act faster, or does Ankara use this case in the framework of its attempt to escalate the tension with Athens?
Given the known facts and the conditions under which the two servicemen were arrested, this issue could be resolved by simply communicating with the other side, as we have done in the past. However, Turkey chose to include it to the tense relations with our country and relegated the matter to a Turkish court. This is not a “weakness” of the Turkish justice to act faster. The two servicemen’s detention is illegal; what’s more, they are held without an indictment. Turkey lingers in the name of court procedures and extends the two Greek servicemen detention. Greece does whatever is necessary, towards all directions and on multiple levels, so as to have our two servicemen back home.
Do you communicate with their parents? What do they say?
I often speak with them. They express their agony and concern for the development of the detention and ask for information. They also talk to me about their children, whom they visit in jail.
The opposition blames the government –on this matter, but also on Greek-Turkish matters on the whole– for having “two lines”. What do you answer? Do you agree that much unnecessary talk has been made on whether they were imprisoned in Andrianoupolis as “hostages” or not?
The government deals with Turkey’s stance and provocative behaviour with a specific and uniform political line. In the exact same way it faces the imprisonment of our two servicemen. Their detention is illegal and offends human rights, as they are established by International Law, including the Geneva Convention.
Do you still believe that there is an opportunity to resolve the Macedonian issue? Since it is a crucial matter of foreign policy, but also given Mr Kammenos’ rejection of the term “Macedonia”, how would you see the prospect of asking a substantial majority of 3/5 in the Parliament, to ratify a potential agreement for the settlement of the Macedonian issue?
The negotiation naturally includes matters that should be resolved. Obviously, the pace of the negotiation’s development is not set unilaterally. Having said this, we could not specifically define the finishing date of the negotiation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs handles the issue responsibly. Mr. Kammenos’ views on the Macedonian issue are known. His disagreement and his relevant opposition is not a component that hinders the negotiation’s course. Parliamentary majority will be the one to decide the approval of an agreement, should we reach one. Referring to the forms of majority is not helpful. The Constitution and the Parliament’s Regulation contain the necessary provisions.
The Government leads the country towards exiting the Memorandum, trying to make it a “clean” one. However, mister Kouvelis, given the fact that usually the improvement of the people’s everyday life comes a lot later than the improvement of numbers and statistics, is there enough time for Syriza and the Government to try to reverse the current gallop poll correlations and re-open the political game?
The country’s exit from the Memorandum will mark the Greek Government’s capability to perform manoeuvres and practice financial and social politics with significant self-sufficiency. The period of the memoranda resulted in the unemployment of many people, to their impoverishment, to the weakening or even the deterioration of the country’s productive and financial backbone; large parts of the middle class collapsed, working rights were eroded and social injustice was increased. The struggle to keep the country and the society standing must be won with socially rightful terms and an essentially progressive policy. The Government has worked towards this direction and promoted its policy for the society’s reform, which is already exercised.
A discussion is ongoing at the Centre-Left about where should the party “Kinima Allagis” (Movement of Change) turn to after the elections, and it is characterised by introversion. On one hand we have the “equal distance” philosophy followed by Ms Gennimata, on the other the strong and daily pressures by Venizelos and Loverdos about a turn to the right. Do you believe that “Kinima Allagis” can remain united in the long run?
Two political poles are being shaped in the country: one is deeply neo-liberal and conservative and the other is progressive. The political forces occupying the middle – either mentioned as the centre-left or social-democratic, justifying their self-determination must seek convergence with the left and essentially end the chapter of a joint course with the neo-liberal policy. The progressive forces, if they wish to truly be progressive, cannot be neutral observers of the conflict between the progressive and the conservative policy and remain inactive as far as their alliances are concerned. The social and political reality and the difficulty of the effort made by the progressive governance, obligates the broad social and political progressive cooperation and joint courses.
The normalization of the relations of the Centre-Left with the Left does not oppose the effort of its self-determination neither does it lead to its determination by SYRIZA. Its conflict with the neo-liberal policy, the detrimental tactics and the doom-saying opposition of the New Democracy party could strategically shape the elements and prerequisites for the establishment of a progressive pole. The conflict of the progressive and conservative forces is still present.
Due to the statements made by some rightist officials regarding the suitability of Venizelos for the Presidency of the Republic, does the discussion for the presidential election of 2020, while the service of the current President Mr. Pavlopoulos is still halfway through, seem unfitting to you?
It is not only unfitting; it is unacceptable. A discussion concerning the Presidency of the Republic, which was introduced by certain rightist members, is subversive of the institutional prestige attributed to the President of the Hellenic Republic. The aspirations of the Opposition should not include any more tendentiousness and undermining.
