GIORGOS SIADIMAS: The US bases in Alexandroupoli are annoying Erdogan. How do we benefit from the presence of the Americans in the area?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: The fact that Turkey states its annoyance due to the bolstered presence of the Americans in Alexandroupoli, based on the stipulations of the mutual defence cooperation agreement between Greece and the USA, precisely attests to its value as an axis of strategic upgrade for Greece in the wider region. My estimation is that Ankara’s annoyance pertains to this exact point. Any estimates that the utilisation of Alexandroupoli by the Americans at the level of development of military infrastructures constitutes a possible threat for Turkey, are completely false. Besides, just the day before yesterday, the US Ambassador in Athens Jeffrey Pyatt made it absolutely clear that the Partnership between Greece and the USA in the Eastern Mediterranean and Thrace does not constitute a threat for Turkey. However, it is certain that the fact that Americans fund projects for the upgrade of the Port and of a local army camp means that this partnership has a substantial context, perspective and apparent national benefit.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: Regarding the revision of the defence agreement with the USA, will weapon systems be given in return? Is there a possibility for participation in the F-35 programme?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: The revision of the MDCA does not automatically imply enhancement in weapon systems, since our defence cooperation with the USA is not developing in terms of an eastern type banter. As long as the Americans realise that Greece constitutes the main strategic partner and pillar of stability and security in the region, then our strategic relation with the USA will be upgraded. That is exactly the spirit clearly depicted in the contractual text of the agreement, where it is stated that a mutual decision has been taken for safeguarding “the security, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity against any action threatening the above”. At this exact point, the national benefit from the MDCA is established. A possible enhancement in weapon systems is a subsequent option. With regards to the participation in the F-35 programme, Greece has expressed its interest and that is corroborated by a pertinent report in the Biden letter accompanying the signing of the MDCA.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: You met your Turkish counterpart Hulusi Akar in the context of the NATO Summit. Will there be a new round of Confidence Building Measures or is there no point for that in this particular circumstance?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: During my recent meeting with the Minister of Defence of Turkey we talked, among other things, about the recommencement of the Confidence Building Measures negotiation. Given however, the recent tension in bilateral relations, I insisted on the need for small steady steps towards the direction of the improvement of our relations’ condition. Such signs in attitude could be for example to refrain from making provocative or inflammatory statements or a discernible decrease of overflights of Turkish aircraft over Greek islands. Only then could the talk about Confidence Building Measures acquire a true meaning and stop being a fruitless procedure of “one step ahead and two steps backwards”. Mr Akar himself seems to agree with this general frame of mind. We shall see.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: In 2025, Greece will have received the first French frigates and all the new “Rafale” aircraft, appreciably improving the power balance with Turkey. Are you worried that in the meantime the Turks will have caused a hot incident? What will your reaction be?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: With regards to Rafale, up to the year’s end, the first six will have been delivered with the second six being delivered in 2022 and the third in 2023. I would like to remind you that the Hellenic Air Force will also proceed to the procurement of six new Rafale, the acquisition of which is currently under negotiation by the competent staffs.
Also, in 2025, we have scheduled the delivery of the first two French frigates.
However, apart from these emblematic programmes of the Armed Forces’ enhancement, an overall plan of Armed Forces enhancement is rapidly underway, either through the upgrade of the existing Weapon Systems or through the acquisition of new ones. Of course, it goes without saying that the operational capabilities, combativeness, readiness and the overall deterrent force of the Armed Forces so as to defend the territorial integrity and the sovereign right of the country, apply any time, where and when required.
That was proven in 2020 and everyone understands it in and out of Greece, according to my estimation.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: Apart from the Belharra, it seems that the Navy is also asking for an intermediate solution. Are you also in talks with Italy? Have you got a particular timetable? Is there an eventuality of the signing of a defence agreement with Italy too?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: Since for almost a year now, the talks and the complex and long negotiations have begun, with regards to the Hellenic Navy’s assets’ enhancement, all proposals and all alternatives are examined. The Italians have submitted their proposal. There are also others. The expeditious delivery timetable of the first two Belharra (two ships in 2025) makes the finding of an intermediate solution less exigent. Besides, the intermediate solution also needs time until the ships are made fully functional and operational and are available to the Hellenic Navy. The positive aspect of this fact is that the process has begun and the negotiations are underway after the delays of many years. The relation with Italy in the field of defence cooperation is starting to be upgraded. The new training jets utilised at the Kalamata training Centre will be procured by an Italian company, while the contract of the Follow on Support for the C-27 transports is currently underway, after a long time. We are cooperating with the Italians at the quadruple scheme of naval cooperation, along with Cyprus and France, while at the same time we are of course partners in the EU and NATO. Consequently, the framework of collaboration and understanding in the field of Defence and Security is there and is already being enhanced.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: The Opposition based its contrariety to the agreement with France on the mention of SAHEL. Do you intend to send the Hellenic Army to that region?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: The region of the sub-Saharan Africa and the situation there constitutes a probable threat of instability for the vital geopolitical interests of the European Union, due to the proximity with North Africa and the Mediterranean. The budding focal points of instability with groups of terrorist organisations and Jihadists who bestir in the region, have nothing to do with any colonialist past, but with a bleak future of instability and security threats. France is leading the European initiative of support for the governments of the region’s countries against that threat and that support will be conducted of necessity with military means too. 9 European countries are already participating with assets and personnel, while 13 more have declared their intention to participate and among them stands Greece. Consequently, the initiative gathers a very wide support from the European countries. In the context of the – now particularly upgraded – allied relation with France, we believe that Greece must also contribute, supporting the friendly nation of France, but also this endeavour for the achievement of the European Union’s strategic autonomy, in deeds and not in words.
GIORGOS SIADIMAS: The coronavirus cases are rapidly increasing. Should we reexamine the matter of obligatory vaccination, for example in the armed forces or at least in some special groups?
NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS: The matter of the overall management of covid is a particularly fastidious case, since the data are developing and are constantly changing. Consequently, the need for adjustment constantly arises, however the constant factor is that the society and the economy must continue to operate in terms of regularity, which can come about only if the vaccinations proceed to a satisfying point of the population’s shielding. I have repeatedly stressed that the armed forces must operate within these conditions. For us it would be inconceivable to put out of operation or out of operational readiness the weapon systems or assets of the Armed Forces due to increased covid cases in the personnel. In this context, we are examining and reexamining the data on a tactical basis. Our goal is to maintain the operational capability of the Armed Forces. We will do what must be done so as to continue achieving that goal.
